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The views in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center 
for Policy Studies, Central European University or the Open Society Institute. We have included 
the reports in the form they were submitted by the authors.  No additional copyediting or 
typesetting has been done to them. 
 The aim of this paper is to discuss some options for filling the gap between the large amount 
of publicly available information on corruption, on the one hand, and the lack of resulting 
civic action in Bulgaria.  
 
Several institutions, local and international, independent and related to the government, 
produce information on corruption at a regular basis. This information is systematically 
distributed by the media, and it seems that it attracts the attention of the citizens, since the 
discourses on corruption are a common topic in the everyday discussions in nowadays 
Bulgaria1. Moreover, corruption has become a key concept for explaining various 
imperfections in the functioning of institutions and individual actors, a tool used with equal 
ease by the European Commission’s reports on Bulgaria and by local communities’ informal 
leaders and native analysts, so there is not only a lot of readily available information, but also 
a kind of consensus on how to interpret it. However, it seems that it fails to provoke the 
expected civic mobilization, which can partially explain why the large scale public awareness 
campaigns are gradually replaced by other tools for fighting corruption.  
I would like to investigate again the missing link between information and action by focusing 
on the mechanism of the public scandals in Bulgaria. The concept of public scandal will be 
defined here following Jeffrey Alexander’s analysis of Watergate scandal2, as a process where 
various social groups recognize a potential danger for their basic values, and therefore get 
involved in different forms of social action. If we accept this definition, the public scandal 
offers and unique opportunity to analyze how different social actors could be mobilized, and 
how the information could be translated into civic action.    
 
 
I. How to make the anticorruption campaigns harmless 
 
Before starting the analysis, the first question is whether such analysis is necessary at all. One 
of the basic assumptions of the donor organizations was that the anticorruption campaigns can 
                                                 
1 In this text I will stick to the local uses of the concept, which means that when my 
informants think and say that there are some corruption at stake, I will report their words 
without looking for further confirmation. 
2 Alexander, Jeffrey, 1990 Culture and Political Crisis: Watergate and Durkheimian Sociology. In: Alexander, 
Jeffrey (ed.) Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 187-224. 
easily mobilize public support3. There was a widespread expectation that once the citizens 
identify the proper target, the corruption in institutions and specific individuals, a reaction 
would follow, and the government would be put under strong pressure to start the necessary 
reforms. It seems that this assumption turned wrong, and several recent reports criticize the 
lack of efficiency of the public awareness campaigns4. Moreover, it seems that the extensive 
discussions about corruption might turn counterproductive. In their recent analysis of the 
unexpected consequences of the widespread anticorruption discourses, Ivan Krastev and 
Georgy Ganev demonstrated how the anticorruption campaigns as a rule create a widespread 
public opinion that the corruption in the government and the administration has actually 
increased5, the more the government speaks about corruption, the firmer the voters’ 
conviction in its dishonesty. The governments that launch anticorruption reforms diminish 
their chances to be reelected, while the civic activity of the citizens is hindered by excessive 
expectations, a growing cynicism discarding the modest positive results, and intimate 
persuasion that the whole society is penetrate by corrupted networks and the government, run 
by corrupted individuals, so little could be done by the private individuals. It seems that it is 
the better option when the efforts to mobilize civic support on anticorruption issues turn out to 
be inefficient; sometimes they might be even harmful.  
 
I totally accept this argument. However, it would be too optimistic to expect that the 
anticorruption campaign would end soon. Too many institutional actors and individuals are 
involved in it. The French political scientist Nadege Ragaru distinguished at least three main 
categories of institutions which actively produce anti-corruption discourses in Bulgaria: 
international institutions, businesses, and NGOs, local NGOs and political parties. In the next 
paragraphs I will follow her analysis. 
                                                 
3 Cf. Martin Tisne and Daniel Smilov, From the Ground Up. Assessing the Record of Anticorruption Assistance 
in SEE, CEU, 2004, <www.ceu.hu/cps> 
4 for an extensive analysis, see Bryane Michael, The Rapid Rise of Anticorruption Industry. Towards Second 
Generation of Anticorruption Reforms in CEE, in: Local Governance Brief, Spring 2004, OSI, Budapest, 17-25 
5 Ivan Krastev and Georgy Ganev, The Missing Incentive. Corruption, Anticorruption, and Reelection, in: Ivan 
Krastev, Shifting Obsessions. Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption, CEU Press, Budapest, 2004 
The corruption discourses could not be stopped by the withdrawal  
of a group of donors or institutional actors 
 
The corruption became a major topic in Bulgarian media since 1997. It has almost 
disappeared from the media and political debates between 1990 and 1997, when the main 
debates dealt with fundamental questions about the Bulgarian society – should we build a new 
type of socialism, or should we follow the European patterns; should we apply for joining 
NATO, or should we join a new Russian-led alliance, etc, etc. By the end of 1996 most of 
these questions about the future were answered, the position of the most influential political 
parties in Bulgaria largely coincided, and it seems that the same consensus prevailed in the 
contemporary Bulgarian society. 
This consensus seriously changed the agenda of the political debate in Bulgaria. The 
government successfully countered any discussion on the framework of its policy, arguing 
(not without reason) that it follows the recommendations of the international institutions, and 
that the state budget is prepared under the close supervision of the IMF and World Bank. The 
role of the government in this process was presented as a kind of advocacy, the ministers 
defending the interests of the voters during the negotiations with the representatives of the 
IMF and WB. The opposition carefully avoided questioning this approach, because its 
arguments might be interpreted as addressed against the basic consensus, which emerged after 
the period of hyperinflation. This left the opposition little ground for a serious debate on 
domestic and foreign policy. They needed something new, something that would allow them 
claiming that they would be able to follow the same consensual policy, but in a better and 
more competent way. The discourses on corruption provided an excellent tool and, unlike the 
period 1990-1997, when the basic principles of the society were at stake, this time the voters 
were more willing to listen to them. 
In a similar development, the corruption issues in Bulgaria became a focus of interest for 
various international institutions after 1997. It does not mean that they were not concerned 
with the corruption in Bulgaria earlier, but the bulk of their attention was focused on more 
dramatic processes, like hyperinflation, privatization processes, or introducing a currency 
board. However, long-term tendencies in the policy of these institutions also had 
repercussions in Bulgaria. Here I will follow the argument of Nadege Ragaru and Ivan 
Krastev, who studied the impact of these tendencies in our country. Several tendencies 
combined in 1990s, they argued, to guarantee a privileged position of the corruption issues 
amongst the international financial institutions.  
The government of the USA had increased its pressure on them to put the corruption at the 
center of their agenda, because the American businesses were frustrated by what they 
conceived as unloyal competition of their foreign counterparts. In a parallel development, the 
IMF and World Bank were frustrated on their own right with the fail of several programs of 
theirs in the Third World, and were inclined to blame the corruption for these problems.  
According to Ivan Krastev, 1997 marked an important turn also in the policy of the IMF and 
World Bank to Bulgaria. Sofia was practically excluded from the international financial 
markets since 1990, when it stopped paying the installments for its foreign debt. The 
prohibition ended in 1995, but Bulgaria began applying and receiving major loans since 1997. 
Moreover, it was after 1997 that Bulgaria became interesting for the foreign investors, when a 
currency board guaranteed financial stability and several state industries and monopolies were 
offered for privatization. The corruption was conceived by the foreign investors as a major 
obstacle regardless of the legal considerations. Unlike the local businesses, the foreigners 
lacked the necessary expertise, they did not know neither how much should be given, nor to 
whom. That is why, the argument of Ivan Krastev goes on, the foreign businesses considered 
the corruption as a specific kind of protectionist policy, accusing the local authorities of 
promoting it discretely and thus giving an edge of the “patriotic” businesses over the 
foreigners. 
On the other hand, since December 1995 Bulgaria is among the 12 applicant states 
challenging EU enlargement. In 1997 the European Commission concluded that Bulgaria has 
fulfilled the political criteria for EU admission and, since then, it has been strengthening the 
stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect 
for and protection of minorities. The 2002 report of the European Commission confirmed that 
in many areas the legal framework has been brought in line with the Treaties, secondary 
legislation and policies of the EU. Great criticism, however, has been focused again on the 
corruption. There is a huge demand for reform in this area and the level of corruption is even 
increasing during the last years. From the EU point of view, Bulgaria cannot make further 
plans for EU membership without solving the corruption problem.   
These factors combined to put the corruption issues at the focus of the international 
institutions in Bulgaria. The results followed quickly. A group of non-governmental 
organizations, led by the Center for the Study of Democracy, joined in “Coalition 2000”. The 
Coalition was created under a grant of the USAID and the World Bank, but latter it received 
grants also from the governments of Austria and Sweden. A few months latter was created a 
local branch of the Transparency International. Both organizations initiated a media campaign 
for combating the corruption, and launched a plethora of projects. The programs “Europe”, 
“Democracy” and “Civil Society”, sponsored by the European Union, also granted important 
funds to several NGO projects, designed at combating corruption. The involvement of foreign 
institutions was not restricted to support of local NGOs. The USAID had initiated a specific 
program, implemented by its own staff, for reforming the justice system and combating the 
corruption. More important, foreign politicians do not hesitate to approach directly the 
corruption issues in Bulgaria. The US ambassador to Bulgaria, Mr. James Pardue made an 
official statement in January 2003 that the corruption in Bulgaria is one of most important 
obstacles that might prevent the accession of the country to NATO. He was echoed in July 
2003 by Mr. Günter Ferheugen who, during his visit in Sofia, singled out the corruption and 
the justice system as the most important potential obstacles to our accession to EU. Last but 
not least, an international conference took place in Sofia on September 5, 2003, when 
ministers of all the Balkan countries gathered under the auspices of the Stability Pact. This 
time the corruption was singled out as one of the most important potential threats for the 
stability of the region, alongside with the ethnic tensions and crime networks. Thus the 
corruption was plainly interpreted as a security threat. Foreign policy priorities, economic 
prosperity, stability of the region – a variety of international institutions officially related the 
corruption to these extremely important issues, and invested in local NGOs and media 
programs dealing with the problem. 
All these factors helped putting the corruption at the center of the debates in Bulgaria. They 
combined with an impressive societal pressure in Bulgaria, as a set of recent surveys indicate. 
It seems that the surprising electoral victory of NMSS and Mr. Saxe-Coburg-Gotha provoked 
a considerable turmoil amongst the think tanks and political analysts in Bulgaria. This could 
explain why three think tanks with different background and political affiliation, launched 
almost simultaneously major research projects to investigate the current agenda of the 
Bulgarian society and its political behavior. The final product were three reports, “The 
Language of the Left”, published by the Institute for Social Democracy in June 2002, the 
“Bulgarian 21 (century)”, published by the Center for Social Practices also in June 2002, and 
the “State of Society”, published by Open Society Foundation in September 2002. My further 
argument will be based on these reports.  
Despite the different political orientation of these think tanks and the different methodologies 
their use, all the reports agree in several points. All of them reach a similar conclusion – that 
the old oppositions between left and right, former communists and anti-communists, 
oppositions that divided the Bulgarian society in early 1990s, have disappeared. The ethnic 
divisions, which were to be expected in any Balkan society, were no more relevant. Instead, a 
major opposition has emerged – that between us, the normal, humble people, and them, the 
elite, defined as politicians, Mafiosi and businessmen. The formers were defined as losers of 
the changes since 1989, while the latter were defined as winners. The most common 
explanation why some people gained from the changes and other lost, was the corruption. 
Another observation, presented in all the reports, was that the average citizens do not 
understand the process of decision making neither in the political parties, supposed to 
represent him, nor in the government. The decisions on specific items, directly related to the 
everyday life, as for example the tax policy and prices of services provided by the state 
monopolies, were not explained to the citizens, they used to come all of a sudden, unexpected, 
unexplained, terrifying. Lacking an official explanation and in a situation where a public 
debate was lacking, the individuals had to construct an interpretation ad hoc, and corruption 
provided an excellent option. The three reports indicate most of the Bulgarian society now is 
failing to understand the logic of extremely important processes. The first one is the growing 
inequality in a society that was held in state of enforced homogeneity for several decades. 
When no other plausible explanation was offered, the corruption discourses provided a good 
solution. In a similar motion, the political actors failed to explain their decisions and the 
functioning of the government and the administration lacked transparency, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
To explain their decisions, the average citizen had to recur again to the corruption discourses. 
These discourses had several advantages from his point of view – they take into account the 
very lack of transparency and build upon it (by definition, the corruption acts are carried out 
in dark); they offer a morally sound excuse for personal failures (one can claim that he failed 
to become rich because of his constant refusal to take part into shadow dealings) and they 
offer a good pretext to blame the rich and powerful. 
Thus, three tendencies of different origin combined. Each one of them followed a different 
logic. The local political actors needed a new agenda after 1997, when the main framework of 
the domestic and foreign policy was constituted. The Bulgarian citizens needed a plausible 
interpretation of major process it was undergoing, while the foreign investors lobbied for fair 
play and the EU and World Bank wanted to guarantee a better use of their grants. Each of 
these actors had a different understanding of the notion of corruption and followed a different 
agenda, but the combination of all of them guaranteed a dominant position of the corruption 
discourses in contemporary Bulgaria. An impressive support staff, designing and proliferating 
anticorruption discourse, emerged. The anticorruption in Central and Eastern Europe has 
become an industry, whose turnover is evaluated by Bryane Michael at 100 millions of USD 
per year, a quickly growing and extremely competitive industry, which has created its own 
professionals.  
 
International institutions, businesses, and NGOs, local NGOs and political parties – the very 
variety of actors producing anticorruption discourses largely precludes any successful effort to 
stop the production and propagation of anticorruption discourses. Each of them has its own 
sources of financing, its own priorities, and its anticorruption activities follow a particular 
logic. The withdrawal of a group donors or institutions, e.g. the international institutions, 
would probably change the balance in the current chorus, and might provoke a shift in the 
accents of the anticorruption rhetoric, but would not stop the campaigns. They will continue 
regardless of their unexpected consequences they have on the public opinion. Thus the main 
negative effects of anticorruption campaigns, indicated by Krastev and Ganev, will probably 
remain. The withdrawal of some actors will not make the anticorruption industry less harmful. 
 
 
Looking for new partners 
 
In their recent assessment of the anticorruption tools used in South-Eastern Europe, Martin 
Tisne and Daniel Smilov analyze some tools for finding a way out of what they call ‘the 
cynicism trap’ and for reviving the citizens’ interest in corruption issues, which would reduce 
the negative side effects of the campaigns. One option is to become more specific. The NGOs 
and the large public coalitions have reached their limits, Tisne and Smilov argue, and the 
networks of people interested in solving a specific problem might be a more efficient 
instrument.  
Another option is to look for new partners. As for as the general public support is concerned, 
the political parties have proven their capacity to mobilize large social groups. Regardless of 
the initial intentions of the international organizations to present the corruption as an apolitical 
issue, the citizens largely interpret it as a political problem, the party leaderships generously 
use anticorruption rhetoric, so the political parties are a logical partner for fighting the 
corruption. Other potential partners are the trade unions and the professional organizations.  
The account of the public scandals that follows might advance our understanding of how a 
campaign, focused on a specific issue, could mobilize public support in Bulgaria, and indicate 
some limitations of the existing organizations as potential partners. 
 
 
 
II. Three case studies 
 
 
I. Is a public scandal possible in a village 
 
The lines of division 
 
The village Trud6 is situated in North-Western Bulgaria, near Danube river, some 30 km. 
from Lom. It has 1014 inhabitants, some 430 of them being of Roma origin, approximately 
560 ethnic Bulgarians and three Turkish families which recently moved to the village from 
South-Western Bulgaria. 
The ethnic Bulgarian community consists mainly of elderly people, whose children have 
migrated to the towns. Only 30 of them are under 45 and there are no children of ethnic 
Bulgarian origin in the local school. On the other side, the ethnic Roma community is rather 
young, both because of the relatively early mortality, and the higher birth ratio. Some 90 
children study at the local school, three of them are of Turkish origin, and the rest are Roma. 
Despite the high presence of Roma children in the school, only two young Roma have 
graduated from high school and no one has university education. On the other had, most of 
the ethnic Bulgarians have graduated from general or specialized high schools, and 6 persons 
have university education.   
Besides the age structure, the two communities have different occupations. All the Bulgarian 
families have more or less land - the size of the plots varying between 40 and 350 da per 
family, where the Roma generally do not own land (with the exception of one enlarged 
family). This is due to several reasons - the landowners before the collectivization of 1950s 
                                                 
6 The names of two localities, Trud and Sreden, are changed to preserve the anonimity of informants.  
were mostly ethnic Bulgarians and the land was restituted after 1991 to their heirs; the 
landowners generally refuse to sell their land; the Roma families generally refuse to 
participate in the land distribution schemes, promoted by the local municipality, because they 
will not be entitled to the main welfare schemes afterwards.  
All the ethnic Bulgarian families are involved in agriculture. A couple of them are officially 
registered as farmers and practice large-scale agriculture, specializing mostly in crops (wheat, 
barley, maize) and sunflower, while the rest are small-scale farmers and their production goes 
mostly for their personal and their children' consumption. The small farmers also sell part of 
their production, mostly milk, vegetables and other labor-intensive cultures. The Roma do not 
own land. Sometimes they are employed by the local rural entrepreneurs, but since the latter 
ones specialize in crops, most of the work is done by machines and extra hands are needed 
only sporadically. More often they are employed by the small farmers during the summer and 
are paid in kind and/or in cash, the fees varying between 5 and 9 BGL, depending on the 
difficulty of the work and the additional payment in kind (food, clothes).   
The main source of income for the ethnic Bulgarians are pensions and, to a lesser extend, 
salaries and revenues from agriculture. The main source of income for the Roma are welfare 
payments, and to a lesser degree pensions, salaries, entrepreneurship, agriculture and informal 
payments from ethnic Bulgarian farmers. Only two ethnic Roma have permanent formal 
employment - one in the village administration, and another as a cleaning woman in the 
school. A Roma family are self-employed, they own the village 'kazan' - the installation where 
the villagers brew they rakia, a strong alcoholic beverage.  
Finally, the two communities are spatially segregated. Most of the Roma are concentrated in a 
district in the southern part of the village, called Roma mahala, or simply 'the mahala', 
mahalata, thickly peopled, where several persons, and in most of the cases, several families, 
live in each house. The rest of the village belongs to the ethnic Bulgarians, and most of the 
houses are inhabited by elderly couples or widows. However, several Roma families moved to 
empty house in other areas of the village. 
   
The village is split between two clearly distinctive communities. The differences between 
them are not only ethnic, cultural and linguistic, but also in income, education, occupation, 
employment, and property patterns. Each of them reinforces the division line and makes it 
more difficult to overcome. The small Turkish community represents some of the 
characteristics of each of two main groups - its age structure and education level are closer to 
that of the Roma, but its sources of income, occupation, and employment patterns remain 
closer to the ethnic Bulgarians. Generally, the Turks remain outside the village politics and 
are not involved in the conflicts and scandals that will be discussed further.  
Of course, neither the ethnic Bulgarians, nor the Roma are homogeneous groups, there 
certainly exist internal divisions and conflicts inside each community, but it seems that at a 
specific moment the internal divisions were obliterated and became relatively irrelevant. 
 
The conflicts 
 
There is an open hostility between these communities, including physical and verbal violence 
and two murder cases. The tensions are generated by three main topics - thefts, employment, 
and welfare payments.  
The thefts are by far the most important one. Practically each ethnic Bulgarian informants 
insisted on telling me several cases when his agricultural production or livestock, was stolen, 
blaming the inhabitants of the mahala (the village district, inhabited by Roma). The 
informants claimed that practically each Bulgarian household has suffered from such razzias. 
However, most of them were unable to quote specific examples of thefts in their own 
household. 
The Roma informants generally did not refute the accusations, but introduced some important 
details. Most of the interviewed Roma agreed that the perpetrators of the petty thefts are to be 
sought in Roma mahala. On the other side, they said, the authors of bigger crimes are among 
the ethnic Bulgarians - namely the rural entrepreneurs, who pay a fraction of the real price for 
the labor of their Roma employees; the former village nomenclature, which profited most 
from the privatization; the president of the cooperative farm and his entourage, who 
successfully maneuvered the farm to bankruptcy, etc. The main message was that both parties 
of the village are guilty, but in a different way. The inhabitants of the mahala earn less from 
their illicit actions, while they are more likely to be punished. Only the president of the 
cooperative farm was tried, but received no sentence, while many inhabitants of the mahala 
served prison terms. All these mutual accusations and self-justifications are quite standard and 
might be encountered in many locations. More interesting in our case is the distinction drawn 
by the villagers between the theft of private property and the theft of cooperative or state 
property. The latter one is considered less harmful and usually does not provoke retaliation. 
The few border cases, when it was not clear where the stolen property was private or not, 
provoked serious debates in the village. One of these cases was when a night watch, an ethnic 
Bulgarian, was caught to steal tractor tires from the newly established small cooperative farm. 
Most of the villagers claimed that the new farm was totally different from the old socialist 
cooperative, because only the few people who created it, invested their own money, land and 
efforts, and will suffer personally from the theft. That is why even the relatives of the night 
watch did not blame the owners who brought the thief to justice (the young man did not 
receive an effective sentence). The second case was more serious, when an old ethnic 
Bulgarian caught a young Roma last summer while stealing electric wires. The men quarreled, 
the young man claiming that it was not old Bulgarian's business, because the wires are not his 
property, while the old man arguing that the wires provide electricity to several local 
households, therefore their inhabitants have a legitimate reason to intervene. Finally, the 
young one struck the elderly fellow and the latter one passed away in a few days. This is an 
extreme example, but it refers to the important issue of the ownership of the village as a 
settlement and community. The ethnic Bulgarians generally consider themselves the 
legitimate owners, while the inhabitants of the mahala usually reject any ownership claim for 
the whole settlement, whatever its source might be. 
Employment is another major source of disputes. The municipal administration, the local 
school, the new cooperative farm, and the two rural entrepreneurs are the only employers in 
the village. Practically all the positions available, with two exceptions, are occupied by ethnic 
Bulgarians - both because they have the relevant educational background, or at least the 
necessary diploma, and because of their domination in the village networks. That is why 
practically all the ethnic Bulgarians who are not pensioners have a job, good or not so good. 
The few positions available are jealously controlled and one of the major disputes in the 
village emerged when the leader of the most influential Roma family in the village offered a 
bargain to the candidates for mayor; he promised the support of the mahala at the votes, if his 
daughter, who has high school education, was employed in the municipality. The offer was 
refused, because it would mean the loss of several ethnic Bulgarian votes.  
Another major topic for dissatisfaction are the welfare payments. Most of the ethnic 
Bulgarians in the village are pensioners and they have a clear understanding that they compete 
with the inhabitants of the mahala for the same resources, "the money from the state". One of 
the main topics of the everyday discussions are the pensions, the small amount of money 
received, and the lack of justice when one receives the equivalent of 60 USD per month after 
40 years of work (the salaries of the workers at the socialist cooperative farms were probably 
the lowest before 1989, and so are their pensions). The discussion usually ends with a 
comparison between the money received by the pensioners, and the welfare payments 
received by their Roma neighbors. The amounts of money do not differ much, and the elderly 
people consider this situation as deeply unfair. 
The most serious current dispute was related to the program 'From welfare payments to 
employment', introduced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. The aim of the program 
is to support long-term unemployed people recovering their basic labor skills and making 
them more competitive at the labor market, by subsidizing temporary job positions. As far as 
the village was concerned, the municipality was identified as the sole potential employer, 
while it turned out that nobody outside the Roma community was entitled to the program - the 
ethnic Bulgarians were either pensioners, or had land and job. Thus the municipality 
employed Roma for public works, mostly cleaning village streets and sewage system, 
repairing village infrastructure, etc. The program fuelled the conflict in the village, most of 
the ethnic Bulgarians interpreting it as yet another device for spending state money for the 
Roma, while my Roma informants often complained that it is mostly the Bulgarian part of the 
village which profits from the works, commissioned by the municipality - the Roma mahala is 
relatively isolated at the outskirts of the village, while the works are concentrated mostly in 
the central parts, where live only ethnic Bulgarians.  
 
 
Introducing the concept of corruption and the start of a public scandal 
 
Both communities regularly refer to the concept of corruption when analyzing their mutual 
relations; and both of them use it for explaining the dissatisfactory way of how the institutions 
are functioning.  
Several ethnic Bulgarians regularly explain by corruption the fact that the relevant institutions 
are unable or unwilling to stop the thefts. According to them, both police and justice refuse to 
be bothered with the small problems of a small village, because the villagers are unable to 
offer them any financial incentives. 'When something is stolen from Meto (a local rural 
entrepreneur), he will turn the earth till he finds the culprit, and he will not let the police 
staying idle. He pays regularly all the police bosses; he drinks with them, so the sergeant 
knows that he should move. When something is stolen from an old lady, she will cry and the 
sergeant might act just in order to get rid of her. When something is stolen from the village, 
nobody would say anything and the sergeant would not bother.’ explained one informant the 
different degrees of involvement of the police. The general presumption was that the people, 
representing the institutions, should have some personal motivation to act. 
In their turn, the Roma used the concept of corruption to explain the fact that several relatives 
of them were actually caught by the police and received effective sentences, while no ethnic 
Bulgarian served a term in the prison. 'If you steal a chicken, you will not have enough neither 
for you, nor for the police. If you steal a lot of money, there will be enough both for you and 
for the police.', explained a Roma informant when I asked his for a glossa of the popular song 
'There is no mercy for a chicken (if you steal it), there is no justice for a million'.  
Several ethnic Bulgarians also explain the unfair, as they conceive it, distribution of the 
welfare money also by corruption. According to them, the mayor had a soft spot for the Roma 
community, because they voices decide the elections. The ethnic Bulgarian voters were 
divided in two relatively equal parts, and it was up to the Roma voters to decide who will be 
the winner. 
  
 Three interesting details attract attention at this stage.  
- The informants were unable to quote real examples of corruption practices, when real 
transactions took place.  
- Second, they regularly referred to corruption when trying to explain why some 
institutions do not function as they expect them to do.  
- Third, the concept of corruption helped them to analyze the (poor) functioning and 
efficiency of the institutions in human, personal and therefore easily understandable 
terms. It seems that the concept of corruption was actively used as a tool for thinking 
and analyzing the institutions. 
 
The specific case which triggered the scandal was the theft of three sheep and a goat from a 
villager. The police was unable to identify the culprit, and refused to investigate the case 
further. The driving force of the scandal was a group of middle-aged women, who have been 
gathering for years in the local House of Culture (Chitaliste). Initially most of them belonged 
to a folk songs ensemble, but latter the same group began inviting professional lecturers to 
hold talks about issues important for the village, e.g. agronomy, human and veterinary 
doctors, etc. An important detail is that most of the members of the group did not suffer 
personally from thefts. The women decided to invite the director of the regional police station 
to hold a talk about the best strategies for preventing the thefts. The talk was major event for 
the village, because several dozens, maybe even hundreds, of villagers gathered - more than 
the hall of the House of Culture was  able to hold, and many times more than for any other 
talk. According to the latter accounts, the policeman was practically unable to speak, because 
the villagers kept shouting questions and latter, open insults at him. The fellow left the hall 
quite angry and accused the women of involving him in a 'provocation'.  
The group of women who organized the talk were also surprised by the reaction of the 
villagers, and decided to keep the momentum. At this stage some members ceased to play an 
important part, while new ones joined. They organized a petition, signed by more than three 
hundred ethnic Bulgarian inhabitants in the village. The petition was 'against the Roma' and 
presented a description of the thefts committed in the village and attributed to the Roma. 
Three village women and a man brought this document to a prosecutor in Montana, asking her 
'to do something'. According to my informants, the prosecutor answered that the request 
should be more specific, and a second petition was prepared and signed, this time pleading for 
a forced expulsion of all the Roma from the village. The steering committee, which was 
joined meanwhile by local men of influence, sought contact with policemen, prosecutors and 
'authorities' to present the petition, but always were answered that the contacted person is not 
competent to discuss the problem. However, the official usually tried to calm the villagers and 
advised them to cancel the petition. The steering committee contacted also a non-
governmental organization, specialized in ethnic issues, which was implementing an 
educational project in a neighboring village. The petition was mentioned in the local media in 
Lom and Montana.  
 
At this stage it seemed that all the ingredients for a large public scandal are available  
- a small and active group, resolved to press the issue;  
- a community ready to support them;  
- a clear understanding among the main actors that the institutions will not act as they 
expect them to do, so they should look for support from elsewhere, and  
- an issue which goes beyond the mere conflicts between neighbors and provoked the 
interest of the media.  
The public scandal was launched, the question was how far it might go. 
 
Then, all of a sudden, the steering committee decided to drop the issue. Here the accounts of 
all my informers do not differ much. According to them, the villagers realized that the issue at 
stake is too important, too far-reaching, going well beyond the scope of their village. The 
authorities they contacted reminded them that the thefts are not a problem restricted to their 
village, and that the solutions also can not be restricted to one single settlement. The local 
mayor, who never supported the petition,  meanwhile kept explaining the villagers that the 
distribution of the welfare payments does not depend of him, but is a state policy. The 
villagers always knew that the thefts are a problem common for the whole area, if not for the 
whole country, but the new contacts and activities helped them understand several dimensions 
of the problem which they neglected before. 'That is how the things go. We cannot change the 
whole country', explained Maria, the undisputed leader of the steering committee.  
 
The scandal died away precisely at the moment when it went beyond the boundaries of 
the village, and when the main actors realized that the issues at stake, solutions sought, 
and protests voiced are of national, not of local importance. 
 
 
 
2. Common Interest and Individual Interests 
 
A town at a crossroad 
 
The second locality where I did fieldwork, was Sreden, a town of some 8823 inhabitants in 
Southern Bulgaria, Plovdiv region.  The town has a rather dynamic demographic balance. 
Approximately 40% of its inhabitants are Muslims of Turkish, Pomak (Bulgarian speaking 
Muslims) or Roma origin. Some 2000 ethnic Turks left it during the great exodus in 1980s, 
but a similar  number of Pomaks moved to the town in the last decades, thus making the 
presence of the Muslim community relatively stable. The newcomers were generally young, 
in their late teens or twenties, thus compensating for the outflow of young ethnic Bulgarians 
who migrated to study and work in larger towns and cities. The Pomaks came from several 
villages in Rodopi mountains. Sreden was the nearest town with a large Muslim community, 
that is why they preferred to settle there instead of Perustitza or Bratzigovo. As they 
explained, Sreden was 'the first town with a mosque'. 
The town has an impressive history as crossroad and transport center, and a significant part of 
its economy depended on it. It remains a place where people are permanently moving and 
commuting. Part of the inhabitants work in Plovdiv and commute every day. Others move 
between the town and the neighboring villages, where they were born and where they go on 
weekends to help with the farming. Still others are residents of larger towns, but regularly 
return to Sreden to visit their parents and relatives.  
Most of the inhabitants are more or less involved in agricultural activities, but in a different 
way. The area around the town is reputed for its apples, and some 200 farmers are officially 
registered as apple producers. Several rural entrepreneurs invested recently in strawberry and 
blackberry production, relying on the cheap labor in the area. Besides the commercial 
farmers, several households in the town cultivate their house garden, sometimes quite large, 
up to 0.15 ha, and produce vegetables for their own consumption and for the market. As a 
rule, the latter ones are old residents of Sreden, the newcomers usually being unable to afford 
a house with large yard in the town. The newcomers get all the vegetables they need for their 
own consumption on the market. 
 
A common problem and a variety of coping strategies 
 
All the inhabitants of the town have to face a common problem - the lack of water. Actually, a 
relatively large river flows amidst the town. It collects the water from several subsidiaries in 
Rodopi mountains and has a relatively stable debit throughout the whole year. Unfortunately 
for the inhabitants of Sreden, the river is also the main source of water for a series of three 
artificial lakes and the corresponding electrical power plants. Both the power plants and the 
artificial lakes are controlled by the Ministry of Energy, which has its own logic. Generally, it 
prefers to hold the water during the summer, when the energy consumption in the country is 
relatively low. The energy consumption rises in the cold winter months and when the needs 
are at maximum, the input of all the power plants is badly needed and it is then and only then 
when it willingly releases the precious water. Then the river starts filling the artificial lakes 
again till the next season. The problem is that the energy consumption in the country is lowest 
precisely in the months when the water is most needed for the agriculture. Each summer the 
municipality and the mayor launch an intensive exchange of letters, telephone calls and visits 
with the ministry of Energy and the management of the power plant, asking for some water. 
As a rule, the pleads are answered after a long delay, if at all, and the amount of water 
allowed is far from sufficient. It seems that the problem is related not only to a lack of good 
will from the Ministry of Energy. When the dam was planned, the level of the underground 
waters in the area was higher and the hydro-engineers calculated that the town could rely on 
them for its own needs. Unfortunately, the level of the underground waters dramatically 
diminished when the river was captured in the artificial lake. Meanwhile, the doors of the dam 
was constructed to allow either a large flow of water, or not at all. When the dam had to open 
its gates during the last summer, when the water began to brim over the dam wall, the 
minimum they could manage, was 160 litters per second (instead of the recommended 40 
litters). In practical terms it means that Sreden has either more water than it needs, or not at 
all.  
 
 The whole population of Sreden is affected by the lack of water. For the apple producers, this 
is one of the most serious problems they have to face. They can get water from three main 
sources: municipality, Irrigation Systems Ltd, and private wells. The municipality controls 
part of the local irrigation system, and sometimes it manages to persuade the management of 
the artificial lake to open the dam doors and let some water in it. Each plot of apple trees is 
related to the main irrigation system through small channels, dug by the farmers. While the 
main system is permanent, the small channels are constructed and reconstructed by the 
farmers each time. The amount of water which might flow through them and its direction is 
controlled by digging deeper or by barring parts of the channel, thus allowing each apple tree, 
even those which are at relatively high places, receive its share. He should work very quickly, 
because he the flow goes between 15 and 30 minutes; the farmer has to run practically all the 
time. The municipality receives a minimal tax. This is by far the best option, both cheapest 
and honest. However, it is also a permanent source of conflicts. The best time for watering is 
during the night, but it is also the time when it is easiest to steal the water of your neighbor. 
According to my informants, it is quite common for a farmer to go till the end of his plot, 
running, digging and closing parts of the channel, watering one tree after another, and to 
notice that his neighbor had meanwhile dug a small link to his plot. The theft is practically 
impossible to notice in the night, unless the culprit is caught while acting, and a good half of 
the water could be stolen that way. The stories about thieves caught and neighbors fighting 
enliven the local chronicles each summer. My informants claim that such crimes are usually 
committed by elderly men and that they start fights more often. The explanations vary 
between respect of force (the young men not fighting, because they are stronger and real harm 
might occur), agility (young men are more difficult to catch), and laziness (they have better to 
do in the evenings). Whatever it might be, the conflicts are serious and present one of the rare 
occasions when grown-up people regularly recur to physical violence.   
Another option is to pay the Irrigation Systems Ltd.  Most of the old irrigation system was 
privatized and became a business society whose main activity is providing water for the 
farmers. The prices requested by the Irrigation Systems are several times higher than the 
municipal ones, but often they are the only option available. The last option is to dig a well, 
and to water the plot with an electrical pump. This is strictly forbidden by the municipality, 
because the underground waters are too shallow anyway, and their use for irrigation would 
leave the town without water at all. However, it is quite difficult to control whether a well is 
used or not, especially in the night.  
Each option provides some opportunities for corruption. The farmers might recur to it when 
trying to convince the municipal inspectors that they do not use illegally their wells. They 
might pay some extra money to the staff of Irrigation System Ltd and to receive more water 
than the official receipt says, and much cheaper than the price fixed by the owners of the 
company. Finally, they might use it as an argument that the municipality should provide 
cheap water when the apple producers need it and not, say, when it will benefit mostly the 
strawberries.  
 
The urban dwellers also are seriously affected. The lack of water is a serious problem for the 
inhabitants of Sreden who cultivate their garden plots. According to my informants, even a 
relatively small plot of 80 m2 could produce enough vegetables to answer all the needs of a 
family during most of the year. Some yards are far more significant, reaching up to 1000 
square meters. Potentially, they are extremely fertile and the owners could easily protect the 
production from thefts, something which is one of the main obstacles for intensive agriculture 
outside the town. The temptation to use these yards for market production, is really serious, 
and quite a few owners could not resist it. The only obstacle is the water. Most of the wells 
inside the town are sealed and it is absolutely forbidden to put a well with electric pump. The 
delinquents are relatively easy to catch, despite the fact that sometimes they are quite 
ingenuous - for example, one of them had constructed a whole underground channel to one of 
the main pipelines in the town, and was caught only by chance. However, the water inspectors 
can easily notice the difference between a well irrigated garden and a dry one, and after 
identifying a potential culprit, they start looking for proofs. That is why most of the gardeners 
have to rely on more standard sources. It is formally forbidden by the municipality to use 
potable water for irrigation, but the inhabitants regularly disregard the prohibition, and water 
their garden plots with potable water. It seems that this is the general rule, and a walk in the 
central parts of Sreden even in the hottest months, usually displays a pleasant sight of yards 
flourishing with well maintained green vegetation, flowers, and vegetables. The municipality 
perfectly realizes the situation and even expects the citizens to act so. According to a deputy 
mayor, the aim of the prohibition was to prevent using potable water for commercial 
agriculture. The water inspectors are expected to close their eyes when only a small garden 
for private use is watered, and to prevent only the massive use of water by people who sell 
their production. Local authorities, water inspectors, and citizens perfectly know of this tacit 
understanding. The latter ones regularly test its limits, and a major part of the working day of 
the water inspectors is usually spend in discussions with customers pleading that they have a 
large family, including children and grand-children living in other towns, so the vegetables 
will not go to the market; or that the vegetables in their garden are of a very special, modern 
and progressive sort, newly selected in Europe or the USA, which does not require much 
water. In the most flagrant cases the water inspectors try to catch the delinquents while 
watering their gardens, and prepare carefully planned operations. Of course, they are not 
always successful. There are several dozens of splendid gardens inside the town, whose 
owners remain unpunished, and which raise speculations and accusations of corruption. 
Unlike the case with the apple producers, who gladly admit bribing the staff of the Irrigation 
Systems Ltd, it is difficult to verify if there were real money transactions between garden 
owners and water inspectors, or if the garden owners were just too smart to be caught. 
Whatever it might be, a delicate balance emerged between garden owners, municipality, and 
water inspectors, establishing the tacit terms of the prohibition and when it might be 
disregarded. This balance was challenged in the recent months by a new water inspector, who 
intended to apply the rules in full. The municipality was rather unhappy with him, because he 
challenged a delicate tacit understanding which took several years to construct. The large yard 
owners were openly hostile, but the inspector enjoyed the full support of his superiors, and , 
unlike some colleagues of his, enjoyed a reputation of total integrity, so he was rather difficult 
to be stopped. The new tax inspector was Bulgarian Muslim and belonged to a family which 
had moved to Sreden relatively recently, which made the conflict even more interesting, 
because not all the inhabitants of the town were affected by the lack of water in the same way.  
 
The agriculture inside the borders of the town was a privilege for the old families, which lived 
in the central parts of Sreden for generations. They belong mostly to ethnic Bulgarian and 
Turkish families and only they have houses with large yards and garden plots.  
On the other side, a significant part of the urban dwellers is concentrated in huge concrete 
buildings, constructed in 1970s and 1980s, when the town developed as an industrial center. 
Some inhabitants of these buildings are industrial workers, who commute to Plovdiv. Others 
are Pomaks who moved recently to the town and were able to afford only a small and poorly 
isolated in the ugly concrete constructions remaining from the socialist period. These are the 
poor parts of the town. The inhabitants of these areas are quite unhappy with the regular water 
shortages in the summer, when sometimes the water supply stops for several days in a row. 
They face basic hygienic problems, and so do the businesses and institutions located there. 
For example, the kindergartens could not function in the dry periods, when the dishes cannot 
be washed and the sanitary facilities cleaned. For people commuting every working day to 
another town, the closure of the kindergarten is a major problem. It is amongst the inhabitants 
of the concrete buildings that the rumors about corrupt water inspectors and municipal 
servants flourished most, and they generally refused to accept the tacit understanding adopted 
in the central parts of the town. The incorruptible water inspector came precisely from that 
part of the town, and was perceived as their champion against the more affluent families 
living in the central parts.  
On the other side, the inhabitants both of the central and the peripheral parts of Sreden were 
angry at the apple and strawberry producers,  and accuse them of accessing illegally the 
shallow underground waters and of  inventing a variety of ways to bypass the official seals 
locking the wells. 
 
 
A failed public scandal 
 
The list of those affected by the water shortage might be continued almost indefinitely, 
including for example shepherds and cattle breeders, the unlucky businessmen who invested 
in fish ponds near the town, restaurant and coffee shop owners, etc. etc. However, to the best 
of my knowledge, it was only one small group which tried to mobilize popular support for 
solving the water problem, namely the local hunting club. The water shortage was a major 
disaster for its members, because their favorite prey, the wild ducks, left the dry river bed, the 
larger animals also moved away, while fish and crabs disappeared. Most of the members of 
the hunting club were quite influential people, including businessmen, civil servants and 
politicians, and their campaign was organized with skill and imagination. Their strategy was 
based on displaying the disastrous ecological consequences of the draught. This choice had 
several advantages - the ecology was an issue going beyond the interests of any particular 
group, it was directly related to the common good of the whole town. Moreover, it allowed 
the steering committee to play one major institution against another, and to build pressure on 
the power plant management and the Ministry of Energy with the help of the Ministry of 
Ecology. Most of the members of the hunting club participated only in the initial discussions, 
but latter the steering committee was joined by new people, mostly politicians, who took the 
relay. Even the minister of ecology, Mrs. Dolores Arsenova, visited the town and urged for a 
quick solution of the ecological crisis, powerful institutions were set in motion, the 
management of the artificial lake had to pay a small fine, and the 'Water Basins' Directorate 
ordered it to provide on a regular basis the amount of water necessary for maintaining the 
ecological balance in the area. The management paid the fine, but forgot about the water and 
the whole issue was dropped in a few weeks.  
 
The parallels with Trud are obvious  
- an issue relevant for the whole community or at least for very significant part of it;  
- a small and very active group ready to press the issue,  
- in both cases this group was relatively marginal for community everyday life and politics, 
both legitimately concerned with the issue and not important enough to dominate the local 
conflicts; there was also  
- a general dissatisfaction with the way how an institution functions (in this case, the Ministry 
of Energy and the management of the artificial lake).  
 
The similarities end here. Despite the fact that the local media (newspaper and municipal 
radio station) provided an extensive coverage of the efforts of the hunting club, it seems that 
the citizens did not pay much attention. Only a few of them gathered to see the minister of 
ecology, and no other group tried to combine its efforts with those of the hunting club. The 
inhabitants of Sreden perfectly realized that more water in the river would mean more water 
for irrigation, higher underground waters and end of the water shortages inside the town, but 
remained passive. The issue at stake affected each of them more or less, but the level of their 
mobilization was far more modest than in Trud village, where the steering committee 
organized a huge rally and gathered several dozens of signatures under their petitions.  
 
There are some interesting structural differences between the situation in Trud and Sreden.  
Both in Trud and Sreden several social groups and categories were affected by the common 
problem, but in the second case each of them was affected in a different way.  
Instead of the massive opposition in the village, where several division lines (ethnicity, 
education, property patterns, age structure, income, etc.) were overlapping, in Sreden a 
variety of social actors were affected in different degrees.  
Second, there were several everyday situations when the social actors were competing 
with the rest for a limited resource, the water.   
Third, a variety of individual coping strategies was available and the local actors recurred 
to them with more or less success in Sreden, while in Trud this option was closed. The 
villagers were pushed to a common action when they considered that all the individual exists 
were closed. When explaining why they signed the petition, most of the informants insisted 
that this was a last recourse and that they have tried individually several other options before.   
Forth, it seems that in Sreden there were real transactions - almost certainly for apple and 
strawberry producers, and quite probable for urban gardeners. However, the informants 
usually interpreted them as an integral part of a range of more or less honorable 
individual coping strategies, starting from cultivating sorts which demand less water, and 
finishing with opening sealed wells, manipulating the water meters, and stealing from thy 
neighbor.  
While in Trud the corruption was mostly an intellectual tool for personalizing and 
explaining the functioning of the institutions, in Sreden it was an individual coping 
strategy. The people most concerned with the corruption were the inhabitants of the 
periphery, which were not interested in maintaining the delicate balance between farmers, 
municipal authorities, and water inspectors or water managers.  
 
The citizens of Sreden immediately associated the steering committee, the local hunting club, 
with a particular group, the inhabitants of the central parts of the town and the large farmers, a 
group which competed with other social groups in the town, and with a particular set of 
interests. The inhabitants of the peripheral parts of the town did not accept the steering 
committee’s claim to represent the interests of the whole community (most of the members of 
the hunting club live in the downtown), while those from the central parts were quite satisfied 
with the tacit understandings regarding the use of potable water for irrigation, and preferred to 
avoid a large public exposure of the issue. The farmers were largely suspicious towards the 
ecological arguments used by the steering committee (according to them, several cheep and 
efficient fertilizers and plant protection chemicals were withdrawn from the market as 
harmful to the ecosystem), and were generally alarmed that a third category of water might be 
introduced, water for ecosystem needs, besides the water for irrigation and the water for 
household needs, a third category that would split part of the already scarce resource.  
The small and active network, which constituted itself as a steering committee, was 
suspected of partiality and failed to mobilize public support.   
 
 
3. Scandal’s ownership problems 
 
The capital town of Sofia offers a variety of opportunities to study corruption scandals. I 
focused only on one scandal, related to real estate, first because there is a running set of 
official investigations against the mayor of Sofia for mishandling of municipal property, and 
second because most of the cases of public protest against the presumed corruption in the 
town, were related to the use of plots of land, sold by the municipality to undertakers and 
investors. 
It seems that the discussions about the municipal real property attract the public attention 
because of an interesting combination of motives.  
Most of the inhabitants of Sofia own the flat or house they live in. According to some surveys, 
almost 90% of the families live in their own lodging. It was a tradition established during the 
socialist period, and most of the young families try to stick to it. Another tradition is to live 
for a long period, even for generations, in the same lodging. Despite all the ups and downs in 
their personal wellbeing, the inhabitants of Sofia generally avoid changing their residence. 
This specificity of the situation in Sofia and Bulgaria has several consequences regarding the 
public scandals. The fact that they own some real property and perfectly know how much 
does it cost, allowed my informants to make a comparison between their own situation and 
the presumed benefits of those who mishandled the municipal real property. They were able 
to grasp immediately the size and the consequences of the actions of the municipality, and to 
evaluate the earnings of the presumed culprits.  
Second, in several cases the decisions of the municipality to sell parts of public gardens or 
facilities to undertakers who constructed there gas stations or apartment blocks, immediately 
deteriorated the quality of life in the neighborhood. The informants conceived this as a 
common problem without any options for individual coping strategies and escapes.  
Third, all the people living in the neighborhood, regardless of their social background and 
interests, were affected in the same way by the decision. No one of my informants considered 
seriously the opportunity to move to another district of Sofia. 
Thus the situation with public scandals related to municipal real estate had some common 
characteristics with the scandal in Trud village. 
The issues related to mishandling of municipal property are a privileged topic also for the 
media. Besides reflecting the interest of the citizens (and customers), it seems that the misuse 
of real estate has two major advantages from a media point of view - the object remains stable 
and easily identifiable for a long period of time, which helps the journalists keeping the 
attention of the public for several weeks and months in a row, and allows enough time span 
for a lengthy journalistic investigation. In other cases, the fact that the object of mishandling 
is easily identifiable, stable and with an undeniable presence, permits the media to do exactly 
the opposite, and to skip the real investigation. The building, the garden, are presented as 
argument per se. A recent report by Access foundation indicated that the bulk of the 
publications related to corruption, do not present any arguments and evidence. The very 
materiality of the real estate helps obscuring this handicap. 
 
Most of my fieldwork in Sofia was focused on investigating the public protests against the 
construction of a gas station in Belite Brezi district. A small public garden near one of the 
main roads in Sofia was restituted to the previous owners of the land, who sold it to a private 
investor. The municipality permitted the conversion of the public garden to a gas station and 
shopping area. A small group of people living in the neighboring area, mostly in their late 
middle age or older, organized a public petition against the conversion and sent it to a variety 
of institutions and media. The construction was postponed for several months, under a general 
prohibition of construction of new gas stations, proclaimed by the municipality. After the 
local elections, the construction works began. A new petition was organized, with several 
hundred signatures, and when it failed to achieve visible results, the steering committee 
organized public protests. Two times the protesters stopped the traffic of the main road. The 
event immediately attracted the attention of the media, who liked especially the slogans 
against the mayor, who was accused of corruption and whose name was converted from 
Sofianski to 'Mafianski'. The mayor indeed was the privileged target of the protests. 
Consequently, several institutions took interest in the case, including the office of the 
prosecutor general and the parliament. The prosecution was unable to find any evidence for 
corruption transactions. The Parliament officially recommended the municipality to stop the 
construction works, and received a short and negative answer. It seems that the deal was 
perfect from a legal point of view and despite the obvious goodwill of the Parliament, it was 
impossible to challenge it in the court. Opposition political parties also took interest in the 
case, and related it to the general functioning of the institutions, the government, and the 
general problems of the contemporary Bulgarian society. Representatives of the governing 
coalition related the case with the way how the municipality is run, the mayor being leader of 
another party.  
It was precisely at the moment when the media and the institutions reacted to the public 
interest and became involved in the case, when the scandal began losing its momentum. It 
seems that a clear negative correlation emerged between the readiness of my informants to 
act, and the scope of the problems which were discussed. When the media, the institutions, 
and the political parties began arguing that the real issues at stake are going far beyond the 
local interests, and that are related to general problems of the country and the society - and 
they could not act otherwise -  the local inhabitants began losing their interest in public 
protests and action.  
The participants in the public protests were mobilized at a local basis, facing a problem that 
affected all the inhabitants of the area in the same way, regardless of the social profile (the 
way how the car owners reacted did not differ from that of pedestrians), and no options for 
individual escapes and coping strategies being left. The steering committee was not related 
with any institution, party, or NGO, and was organized ad hoc. The citizens mobilized in that 
way began to disband when the issue at stake reached a national dimension, when institutions 
of national importance became involved, and when the problems discussed reached issues like 
the state of the Bulgarian society. 
The massive involvement of the media coincided with a change of the ownership of the 
scandal. At this stage, the political parties competing with the Sofia mayor increased their 
activity and began voicing the protests of the citizens. The participants in the public protest 
reacted quite negatively to the efforts of different political parties to join in, and to 
present the local action as a protest against the way how the municipality, and/or 
government, and/or society works.  
 
4. Common tendencies 
 
Four main tendencies could be identified in these case studies.  
First, it might be argued that the social actors tend to prefer individual coping strategies to the 
public action. In practical terms, it means that there is potential for public scandal mainly 
when the chance to find individual exits, coping strategies and solutions, is minimal. As 
far as the corruption is concerned, the real corruption transactions are often conceived as part 
of the coping strategies, which means that those who are involved in them, including the 
injured party, are not very probable to join a public protest. 
Second, it seems that the potential for public action is greater when all the social groups 
are affected by the same problem in a similar way. Otherwise the social actors tend to 
interpret the situation as a filed of real or potential competition for scarce resources, and are 
not very likely to combine their efforts for solving the problem. When they are affected in a 
similar way, and the options for individual escape are minimal, they might recur to the 
concept of corruption to explain the poor functioning of the institutions. The accusations of 
corruption might not be substantiated, or they are certainly less substantiated than in the 
previous case, but the potential for civic action seems to be higher. 
Third, the public protest ends and the scandal loses its momentum at the moment when 
the main actors decide that problems, issues and values important for the whole society 
and the whole country, are at stake.  This detail is especially interesting, because most of 
the existing analyses of public scandals in the social sciences clearly indicate that it is 
precisely the realization that common values (or interests, or moral imperatives, or generic 
human capacity of justice) are at stake. It is at this moment when a local protest might turn 
into a large scandal, when various social actors decide to get involved, despite the fact that 
they have little to do with the initial event which triggered the scandal. Interestingly, in the 
cases discussed above it was precisely at this moment when the public action began to lose 
momentum.   
Forth, there is a widespread cynicism regarding the political parties, matched only by the 
suspicion towards the NGOs. The participants in the public protests regarded ‘the politicians’ 
as a relatively homogenous category, whose members are equally prone to corruption. The 
efforts of the political parties to join and channel the protest, provoked a paradoxical 
reaction, the citizens directed their suspicion towards the members of the steering committee, 
began questioning their motives in a new way (‘why they attacked precisely this politician, 
and not somebody else’, ‘who would profit from the exposure of this particular politician’, 
and ergo, ‘who would profit from that action’), gradually accepted a new interpretation of 
their own action, as something profiting particular political interests, and withdrew from the 
protest.    
 
 
III. How to make a corruption scandal 
 
The common characteristics of the public scandals investigated here indicate that 
anticorruption campaigns, related to specific issues, could mobilize public support. An 
impressive set of limitations emerged, regarding to the issues, the way how the local actors 
are involved, and the coping strategies, but the opportunity still exists. 
Three main suggestions could be offered at this stage. 
First, the most successful public scandals were launched on issues which concerned a variety 
of social groups in a similar way. The local actors did not compete for specific resources, the 
corruption was not interpreted as a possible coping strategy, and actually not individual 
coping strategies were available. 
Second, the local networks certainly could be potential partners for such campaign. However, 
the local NGO or steering committee would be more efficient if its actions are not 
misinterpreted by the local actors as promotion of the interests of a restricted group. In the 
most successful cases, the ownership of the scandal constantly changed, new people taking 
rely from the initial organizers, to be replaced in their turn by other newcomers. At this stage, 
the involvement of the political parties seemed counterproductive. The activists quickly 
interpreted their own actions in a new way, as serving a particular party’s interests, and 
withdrew7.  
Third, the most efficient tactics would probably be to present the specific case, which 
triggered the public scandal, as unique and exceptional. This approach would help reducing 
the harm, usually associated with the anticorruption campaigns and to avoid the cynicism trap. 
It would prevent the unproductive misunderstandings, associated with the uses of the concept 
of corruption. And finally, this approach has more chances to mobilize public support for 
solving a specific case. When the citizens are tired with and cynical about anticorruption 
discourses, a modesty in the discourses might turn more efficient.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Moreover, in the first and the third case study, the opposition parties seem more interested in joining an 
anticorruption scandal. Referring to the problem of missing incentive, analyzed by Ivan Krastev and Georgy 
Ganev, the opposition parties probably will be more motivated for producing and spreading anticorruption 
discourses. 
